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Information security has become an increasingly 
important aspect in companies and households during 
this time of digitalization. Cyber attacks and 
especially ransomware attacks are a growing threat. 
How people react to and perceive this threat is a 
central component of this study. This paper is meant 
to investigate how threat and efficacy influence 
individuals’ information security behavior. For this 
purpose, a structural equation model was developed 
using the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM). 
The results show that participants who received a low 
threat message in their ransom demand were less 
afraid and more likely to deal with the issue. At the 
same time, they were not as confident as people who 
perceived a significant threat. Participants who felt 
that they had little adequate protection against 
ransomware were more fearful and therefore dealt 
with the topic more defensively. Conversely, they also 
had the intention to behave safely.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Information technology is being used both 
professionally and privately, so the danger of security 
attacks is omnipresent [1]. This study examines the 
extent to which individuals can be motivated to protect 
their data and prevent attacks. Some of such attacks, 
called fear appeals, involve persuasive messages, 
which include plausible threats. These fear appeals are 
mainly used in the healthcare industry [2]. In the 
relevant academic literature, fear appeals are often 
used to describe negative consequences and thus 
reduce undesired behavior [2]. The use of fear appeals 
is widespread in research, and such messages are 
widely believed to be more effective achieving a 
security threat [2], [3]. The German Federal Office for 
Information Security assumes that severe threats are 
mostly posed by ransomware attacks, which cost 8 
billion dollars worldwide in 2017 [4]. One of the most 
well known ransomware types is WannaCry, which 
caused enormous global damage estimated at several 
hundred million to four billion dollars [4]. WannaCry 
attacked more than 200,000 computers in 150 
countries [4]. Such ransomware attacks can lead to, 
among other things, data loss due to access by third 
parties [5]. Users can be motivated to protect their data 
from such attacks to mitigate ransomware threats and 
ensure information security behavior. Two common 
methods to encourage users to increase their data 
security and be less afraid of ransomware attacks are 
creating backups and using antivirus scanners [5]. 
However, past research in the field of information 
security compliance behavior shows that technical 
measures alone are not sufficient to guarantee 
information security. Primarily because security 
attacks are mainly targeted at the weakest link in the 
security chain, it is even more important to take a 
socio-technical approach and implement behavioral 
measures to minimize individuals’ non-secure 
behavior [6]. 
The literature on information security compliance 
behavior research often used and defined fear appeal 
as follows: When a person is confronted with such 
threats, assessment mechanisms are triggered, leading 
to certain behavior in the given situation and deciding 
whether the person protects their security. One theory 
that explains the influence of these messages is Witte’s 
[7] Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), which 
is often used in health-related contexts [7]–[10]. The 
EPPM includes components of other established 
approaches for explaining such behavior-oriented 
decision-making processes, such as the Protection 
Motivation Theory (PMT) [11]–[13] and the fear 
control framework, according to Leventhal [14]. The 
EPPM is intended to prevent the protection or 





defensive motivation process from being considered 
alone in the PMT or the fear control framework and 
provides a more holistic view on the decision-making 
process [15]. 
Looking at the context of the behavior-specific 
effects of ransomware on individuals, no explanations 
that describe the behavior of individuals when 
confronted with ransomware can be identified so far. 
Although there are technical measures to avoid 
ransomware, approaches to avoid the effectiveness of 
ransomware from a social-behavioral perspective, 
which aims to increase awareness and behavior 
towards a security threat through ransomware, are still 
missing. This paper aims to contribute to an 
explanation of the problem and examines the 
following research question:  
 
RQ: How do fear appeals influence users’ intentions 
to change their information security behaviors in 
ransomware? 
 
Our findings yield important insights for theory 
and practice. From a theoretical point of view, we 
provide the first approach to explain ransomware 
security behavior and provide a starting point for 
further theoretical consideration of one of the most 
current and dangerous security risks. The EPPM 
model lends itself to our approach, because it uses 
well-known constructs to explain threat and coping 
appraisals and associates them in context with both 
behavioral intention and defensive avoidance. 
Although current information security research 
focuses on the connection between threat, coping 
appraisals and behavioral intention, a connection with 
fear and defensive avoidance in a unified context and 
model is missing [6], [9]. Additionally, practitioners, 
such as information security managers, can use our 
results to develop measures against ransomware’s 
effectiveness and meet the need for socio-technical 
measures in this area. Private individuals receive 
advice from our results on how they can better protect 
themselves against ransomware. 
We investigated the stated question by 
implementing an empirical research design based on 
an EPPM model adapted for our context. We collected 
data from a sample of 507 German participants to 
analyze our research model using Partial Least 
Squares (PLS) structural equation modeling.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. 
After the introduction, the theoretical foundation is 
explained in chapter two. Afterward, we provide an 
overview of the EPPM. Next, our hypotheses and the 
research model are introduced in chapter three. After 
explaining our methodology in chapter four, the 
structural model and measurement of this study are 
presented in chapter five. This is followed by 
evaluating the results and the subsequent discussion in 
chapter six, which includes implications and 
limitations. We conclude our study in chapter seven. 
  
2. Theoretical background  
 
The following section outlines the relevant 
theoretical foundation for the study. First, fear appeal 
and the extended parallel process model are explained. 
Next, the practical context is described, declaring 
ransomware as an information security threat. 
 
2.1. Fear appeal and the extended parallel 
process model 
 
In a basic definition, fear appeals can be described 
as convincing messages aimed at frightening people. 
This is to be achieved by describing the terrible things 
that will happen to a person if they act contrary to the 
message sent by the fear appeal [16]. A fear appeal 
message is intended to get a person to change their 
behavior because of fear. Fear appeals generally 
consist of three elements: Fear, threat, and 
effectiveness. The result of a fear appeal is the 
acceptance of a message, which is defined as a change 
of attitude, intention, or behavior [12]. Fear appeal is 
relevant in our context because it initiates message 
transmission and is the trigger for consideration and 
causes a specific behavior. In this context, a threat 
represents an external stimulus that exists 
independently of an individual's perception. If an 
individual perceives the threat, it can be said that the 
individual is aware of a threat. When a fear appeal is 
constructed, it is designed to convey first that there is 
a threat to an individual, and second, to show its 
severity and the vulnerability of the individual to the 
threat. From the fear appeal, the considered individual 
should derive the threat severity and the perceived 
vulnerability to the threat. In the considered behavioral 
formation process, as soon as a person is aware of a 
threat, the convictions about the severity of the threat 
and the probability of personally experiencing the 
threat also build up. In addition to a threat, the 
individuals’ efficacy also influences the behavioral 
development process, triggered by a fear appeal [12]. 
The construct efficacy can be distinguished 
between response efficacy and self-efficacy [16]. 
Response efficacy is the extent to which a person 
believes a measure is effective against a threat. If a 
person does not believe a measure to be successful, 
they are less willing to adopt a behavior against it [17]. 
Self-efficacy is the degree to which a person believes 
in their ability to perform an action against a threat 
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[11]. The term self-efficacy thus refers to a person's 
perceived competence. In information security, people 
with a high degree of self-efficacy are more willing to 
implement security measures [17]. 
Various approaches describe the relationships 
between fear appeal, efficacy, and threat and their 
dependence on behavior formation in the existing 
literature. One of the models is the PMT by Rogers 
[18]. The PMT is divided into three phases [19]. In the 
first phase, information is obtained related to fear 
appeal and experiences with the danger. The second 
phase is the cognitive mediating process. This process 
is divided into two components: Threat assessment 
and coping assessment [19]. The last phase is coping, 
in which the behavioral intention is examined [19]. 
The advantage of PMT is that it is a widely used model 
among researchers for the influence of anxiety attacks 
[11]. Another model is the Parallel Response Model 
[14]. In this model, it is assumed that communication 
causes fear on the one hand and persuasion on the 
other hand. It should be noted that fear does not 
generate persuasive power. The theory focuses on the 
factors that lead to mastery of the information process, 
such as behavior that causes fear [14]. In addition, with 
its fear and coping reactions, one’s organism can also 
serve as information that influences individual 
decisions [14]. Different sources of information can, 
therefore, provoke particular behavior patterns at 
certain times [14]. 
An extended model for explaining fear appeals and 
their impact on behavior is the EPPM. The model 
describes a combination of the danger control/fear 
control framework of Leventhal [14] with some 
elements of Rogers’ [18], [19] original PMT [16]. 
These are subdivided into self-efficacy, response 
efficacy, susceptibility, and severity. These 
components are perceived and evaluated by the 
recipient. Self-efficacy describes the expectation of a 
person to carry out desired actions successfully based 
on their competencies, while response effectiveness 
refers to a person's beliefs about whether or not an 
action actually averts a threat. Susceptibility refers to 
the subjective perception of a risk for a perceived 
threat’s negative impact, while severity describes the 
perceived threat's severity. Depending on the degree 
of perceived efficacy and perceived threat, there are 
several possible outcomes. If the perceived threat and 
perceived self-efficacy are high, this leads to 
protection motivation and adaptive changes. This 
process is called threat control [16]. When the threat is 
high, but the response efficacy to the threat is low, the 
message leads to anxiety control processes that cause 
maladaptive changes. If the threat is low, there is no 
response because no fear has been generated. 
According to the EPPM model, the higher the threat, 
the greater the evoked fear, the more attention the 
message attracts, and the more the message is 
integrated into the behavioral education process [16]. 
The process is as follows. First, the message and the 
threat are evaluated. If the resulting fear is high, the 
individuals’ efficacy is also evaluated. The fear 
control process and the threat control process run 
simultaneously. The threat is not the decisive variable, 
rather the threat’s efficacy, since it determines which 
process will be dominant [16]. Threat control 
processes are processes in which the individual 
manages the threat by taking preventive measures to 
reduce an event’s probability. In contrast, fear control 
processes are primarily emotional processes in which 
the individual only copes with their fear rather than 
with the danger [16]. In our study’s framework, we use 
the EPPM model, because it considers both protective 
and maladaptive coping mechanisms compared to 
PMT and the hazard control/anxiety control 
framework, and thus describes the effects on fear 
appeals in a holistic way. A maladaptive coping 
mechanism, also called defensive avoidance, describes 
how to avoid dealing with a stressor. 
 
2.2 Ransomware as an information security 
threat  
 
According to relevant practice related literature, 
ransomware is defined as follows: Ransomware 
describes malware that restricts or prevents access to 
data and systems and releases these resources only 
against payment of a ransom. The name ransomware 
is a nested word from the terms “ransom” and 
"malware".” [5] 
Ransomware enables third parties to block or 
prevent system access or encrypt user data. Windows 
systems are most often affected. The most common 
attack vectors are attachments of spam emails and 
“drive-by-attacks” using exploit kits (i.e., malware on 
websites), USB sticks, and network drives [20]. 
According to a BSI survey, ⅓ of the companies 
surveyed said they had been affected by at least one 
ransomware incident in the last six months, with ¾ of 
cases involving email attachments. The consequences 
of ransomware, both in the private and business sector, 
can be seen primarily in damage to the own reputation, 
the loss of data and hardware, as well as monetary 
damages [5]. Protection measures in organizations 
include backing up relevant data, raising employees’ 
awareness of current attack methods (e.g., macros in 
Microsoft Office documents), and using antivirus 
scanners [21]. 
Existing research on information security behavior 
does not yet consider ransomware, which leaves open 
Page 6693
potential for identifying socio-technical measures to 
ensure information security regarding ransomware. 
 
3. Research model and hypotheses 
development 
 
The following research model (Figure 2) is based 
on the EPPM [16] and the implementation of the work 
of Birmingham et al. [8]. We adapted the model for 
our research context of information security. The 
threat construct consists of the mechanisms 
susceptibility and severity, and the construct efficacy 
can be further sub-conceptualized into self-efficacy 
and response-efficacy. We adapted the original 
constructs fear and defensive avoidance and adapted 
the original construct intention into behavioral 
intention related to ransomware. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
Based on Witte’s EPPM [16], we propose the 
following five hypotheses. 
As can be inferred from the EPPM [16], we 
aggregate threat susceptibility and threat severity in 
one measuring construct. Despite the dependence on 
efficacy, regardless of whether the danger control 
process or the fear control process initiates, the level 
of perceived threat has, in both cases, an essential 
influence on the intention to protect one’s security. 
The perceived threat has an essential influence 
because of the danger control process; in our case, 
intention to take protective action only initiates when 
the threat is sufficiently severe [16]. To ensure that 
participants are offered an incentive to protect 
themselves from ransomware, ransomware dangers 
are emphasized in the case of a fear appeal with a high 
threat. Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H1: Threat has a positive effect on behavioral 
intention. 
In contrast to the PMT, the EPPM considers fear as 
another variable [16]. The danger control process or 
fear control process is initiated based on the fear 
appeal’s efficacy. Efficacy should be low if threat 
influences fear arousal. Nonetheless, fear cannot be 
evoked if the threat condition is low, so a more 
threatening fear appeal positively influences fear [16]. 
By illustrating the danger of ransomware, depending 
on the degree of efficacy, fear can be aroused. With 
this understanding, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Threat has a positive effect on fear arousal. 
The construct efficacy consists of two components, 
self-efficacy and response efficacy [16]. The EPPM 
shows that only efficacy determines whether the 
danger control process or fear control process occurs 
[16]. In precise terms, fear arousal increases when 
efficacy is low in the fear control process [7]. One 
explanation is that people might feel helpless or 
incapable of opposing the threat [7], [22]. Therefore, 
fear arousal is partly influenced by security 
technologies’ level of security [13]. If people assume 
that antivirus scanners and backups are not effective 
against ransomware, fear arousal increases. Therefore, 
we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Efficacy has a negative effect on fear arousal. 
In contrast to increased fear arousal due to lower 
efficacy, fear appeals with high efficacy positively 
influence intentions to behave securely if they are 
sufficiently threatening. This hypothesis is supported 
by Witte’s research on AIDS prevention [7]. Thus, the 
danger control process initiates. Anderson and 
Agarwal [23] indirectly support this hypothesis; they 
found a significant positive effect on attitude, which 
also significantly influences intention. An explanation 
could be that there is a realistic possibility for a person 
to oppose or prevent the threat if the danger is 
significant enough to merit protection [16], [22]. More 
specifically, this means that people are willing to 
oppose a potential ransomware threat if the defense 
measures are effective against it to protect themselves. 
The individuals must also be confident that they can 
protect themselves, as demonstrated by the ease of use 
of protective measures with high efficacy in the fear 
appeals [13]; therefore, we derive the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Efficacy has a positive effect on behavioral 
intention. 
Fear can be described as an inner emotional 
reaction with psychological and physiological 
dimensions triggered by cognitive stimuli [22]. Fear 
has been hypothesized to be aroused by fear appeals 
with high threat and low efficacy. Fear was found to 
have a significant positive effect on avoidance [24]. 
Hence, fear is referred to as a driver [14]. When 
transferred to the EPPM, the fear control response 
follows the fear control process’ initiation [22]. 
Defensive avoidance is denying or blocking 
confrontation with the threat [7], [24]. This defensive 
avoidance can reduce the feeling of discomfort [24]. 
To reduce the uncomfortable feelings, individuals will 
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avoid information about the potential dangers of 
ransomware, in case of a positive influence of fear on 
defensive avoidance. Contrarily, Birmingham et al. 
[8], who also examined fear appeals in a health-related 
context, demonstrated that fear has a significant 
negative effect on defensive avoidance. Despite the 
contradictory results of the influence of fear on 
defensive avoidance, we offer the following 
hypothesis: 





An intervention design using two independent 
variables was developed to test the proposed 
hypotheses in an online survey. The independent 
variables were manipulated and randomly assigned to 
the participants [25]. In the following sections, we 
describe the data collection of the sample and the 
research design, and the measurement of the variables. 
 
4.1 Research design 
 
To test our hypotheses, we manipulated the 
independent variables to correspond to the following 
conditions: high vs. low threat and high vs. low 
efficacy. It is important to note that the participants 
always received a message that expresses threat in 
combination with a message that expresses efficacy. 
The following possible combinations were shown to 
the participants by means of randomization: high 
threat/ high efficacy (HT/HE), high threat/ low 
efficacy (HT/LE), low threat/ high efficacy (LT/HE), 
and low threat/ low efficacy (LT/LE). The information 
that was displayed to the participants in the survey is 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Intervention messages 
Low 
Threat  
Attacks by ransomware like WannaCry can 
cause economic damage. Ransomware is 
malicious software that restricts or prevents 
access to data and systems and only releases 
them against a ransom payment. The 
damaged parties can, therefore, be deprived 
of data. Ransomware attacks account for only 
7% of all malware attacks worldwide. In 
addition, a sharp decline in ransomware 
attacks has been observed since 2018. 
High 
Threat  
Attacks by ransomware like WannaCry have 
caused economic damage of more than eight 
billion dollars worldwide in 2017. This 
damage amounts to millions in Germany 
itself. Ransomware is the term used to 
describe malware that restricts or prevents 
access to data and systems and only releases 
them against a ransom payment. The 
damaged parties can, therefore, be deprived 
of essential data. The formation of new types 
of ransomware can lead to new methods of 
attack. Therefore, there is no reason to sound 
the all-clear regarding ransomware attacks. 
Low 
Efficacy  
Possible measures effective against other 
malware, such as regular updates or the use 
of antivirus programs, are not always 
sufficient against ransomware. 86% of 
ransomware could not be detected by the 
standard antivirus program (Windows 
Defender) in a simulation test. Ransomware 
attacks can block access to the backups of 
data (backup copies). Due to new 
possibilities to smuggle ransomware into the 
system, it is harder or even impossible for 
antivirus programs to detect it. 
High 
Efficacy  
Essential to protect oneself from ransomware 
attacks is antivirus programs, as they have a 
detection rate of up to 96%. Antivirus 
programs are designed to prevent malicious 
programs from running on the computer. The 
Federal Office for Information Security also 
expressly recommends preventive measures 
such as regular updates and backups of data 
(backup copies). In just under 7 out of 10 
cases, the data blocked by ransomware can 
be made accessible again through backups. 
The measures mentioned above can be 
implemented quickly and easily. 
 
The low threat condition was designed to convince 
participants that the threat was trivial [15], i.e., that 
ransomware was not a severe threat. Contrarily, the 
high threat condition convinced the participants that 
they were at significant risk due to the ransomware’s 
omnipresent danger. In the low efficacy condition, we 
based our manipulation on the assertion that a threat 
cannot be averted [15], i.e., measures against 
ransomware are ineffective. In the high efficacy 
condition, we manipulated efficacy, so participants 
believed that they could effectively avert a threat, so 
measures against ransomware are successful [15]. All 





4.2 Data collection and sample  
 
We collected data among participants through an 
online survey. The participants consisted of people 
who work with a computer in their daily work (or 
private) lives. The questionnaire was translated from 
English into German in order to ensure 
comprehensibility for the participants. An overview of 
the English questions is provided in the appendix. In 
addition to the intervention messages that describe 
threat and efficacy, manipulation checks were carried 
out, and we included questions on three constructs 
relevant to our study context. Participants were 
introduced to the scenario, after which we included 
attention checks to make sure the participants read and 
understood the intervention message. The behavioral 
intention (BI) scale we used is based on the research 
of Johnston and Warkentin [11], Workman et al. [26], 
and Ng et al. [27]. The defensive avoidance (DA) and 
fear arousal (FEAR) items were adapted from 
Birmingham et al. [8]. The questions were adapted to 
the context of ransomware. Additional variables we 
collected include Johnston and Warkentin’s [11] 
general questions on information security and 
demographic questions. We used a five-point Likert 
scale to measure our items. Last, we ensured that the 
participants were debriefed about ransomware’s real 
danger and the possibility to oppose it. The debriefing 
was executed through a text, which contained all 
information on efficacy and threat, in contrast to the 
partial information in the intervention messages. 
Furthermore, we conducted a preliminary study with 
12 subjects (8 complete responses) to check our 
questionnaire’s consistency and make sure that the 
participants perceive the right levels of threat and 
efficacy in the questionnaire. 
578 German participants took part in our study that 
we ran from July to August 2019. Among these 
answers, 507 were complete and valid answers, which 
were used for the evaluation. Of these, 58.6% were 
female, 40.4% male, and 1% other. The average age of 
the participants was 25.6 years. Most participants hold 
a bachelor's degree (37.9%) or completed high school 
(32.4%). Furthermore, most participants were young 
professionals with 1-2 years of work experience 
(25.4%). This implies that our participants are subject 
to threats by ransomware in corporate and/or private 
settings. The distribution of the participants across the 
four groups was approximately equal (HT/HE: n= 122, 






5. Data analysis and results 
 
A Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) approach 
was used to evaluate the data. It allows testing and 
evaluating hypothesis-based causal relationships [28]. 
Information systems, as well as several other research 
disciplines have applied the variant-based Partial 
Least Square (PLS) method. The SEM technique is 
also particularly well suited for the current research, as 
it allows multiple relationships between latent 
variables to be measured with multiple indicators [29]. 
Moreover, the paths for measuring the latent variables 
and the hypothetical relationships between the latent 
variables can be estimated simultaneously. 
 
5.1. Measurement validation 
 
There are two independent variables for the model 
to be examined: threat and efficacy. These 
independent variables are manipulated in the study and 
are, therefore, binary variables (0 or 1). In addition, 
reflective relationships of the variables fear, 
behavioral intention, and defense avoidance were 
modeled. It was found that all elements load and 
internal consistencies of the reflectively modeled 
constructs are above the limit of 0.7. The only 
exclusions are the second and third elements of the 
defense avoidance construct (see appendix). These 
were removed due to the limit of 0.7 not being reached. 
The criteria of composite reliability (CR) and 
extracted mean variance (AVE) are shown in table 2. 
They are used to assess the reliability and validity of 
the construct. The requirements are met if all 
constructs evaluate CR values higher than 0.7, and 
AVE values higher than 0.5 [30]. The requirements for 
both criteria are met because all CR values are well 
above the limit of 0.7, while all AVE values also reach 
the limit of 0.5. By comparing the AVE’s square root 
with the correlations between the constructs, Fornell 
and Larcker offer an approach to assess discriminatory 
validity. The comparison shows that all constructs 
retain a higher value for the AVE’s square root than 
for the correlation with other constructs [31]. 
Table 2. Construct validation 
  AVE CR EF TA FEAR BI DA 
EF n.a. n.a. 1         
TA n.a. n.a. -.002 1       
FEAR .780 .946 -.126 .162 .883     
BI .702 .934 .130 .163 .212 .838   
DA .674 .796 -.026 -.042 .316 -.020 .821 
EF = Efficacy; TA = Threat; FEAR = Fear Arousal, BI = Behavioral Intention;  
DA = Defense Avoidance 
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5.2 Hypotheses testing 
 
The PLS method was used for estimation to test the 
theoretical structural model described above. A 5000-
sample bootstrapping resampling method was used to 
assess the significance of the paths. The estimation of 
the path model is shown in figure 2 for the relevant 
paths. From these results, it can be concluded that we 
find support for the basic structure of the theory.  
A significant effect was found for all hypotheses. 
It was found that threat (.163; significant at .01) has a 
significant positive effect and efficacy (.126; 
significant at .01) has a significant negative effect on 
fear. In turn, fear has a significant positive effect on 
defense avoidance (.319; significant at .01). A 
significant positive effect of threat (.163; significant at 
.01) and efficacy (.131; significant at .01) on 
behavioral intention was also observed.
 
 
Figure 2. Structural model with path coefficients  
Note: ** significant at .01 
Additionally, the following control variables were 
used: age, gender, educational level, job level, threat, 
and efficacy. Except for threat on defense avoidance ( 
-.091 significant at .01), these control variables had no 
significant influence. In summary, all proposed 
hypotheses are supported. 
 
6. Discussion and summary of findings 
 
The following is a summary of the results. 
Moreover, the implications for theory and practice are 
reviewed. Afterward, the limitations of the work and 
possibilities for future research are discussed. 
 
6.1. Summary of findings  
 
The paper examines how the EPPM with its 
constructs threat and efficacy in ransomware can be 
used to influence fear and thereby, defense avoidance 
and the behavioral intention to behave securely. Thus, 
an understanding of how the EPPM works in the 
context of ransomware and whether it is applicable is 
developed. It can be summarized that threat and 
efficacy positively influence behavioral intention, i.e., 
participants who have been positively influenced by 
these two constructs tend to behave more securely. 
Contrarily, the positive effect of threat and the 
negative effect of efficacy on fear result in defensive 
avoidance, i.e. participants tend take no action. In 
summary, one can say that this is a current and highly 
relevant topic with high practical relevance. The 
effects of the EPPM have already been investigated in 
various contexts, but have never been investigated in 
the context of ransomware. Therefore, this paper 
presents both theoretical and practical implications. 
However, this paper is not free of limitations, which, 
at the same time, provide opportunities for future 
research. 
 
6.2. Implications for theory and contributions 
to literature 
 
This study provides a theoretical contribution by 
testing the EPPM in the context of ransomware. This 
should lead to a better understanding of how the EPPM 
works in the new context. The EPPM was shown 
through Witte [7] to influence fear, defense avoidance, 
and behavioral intention [25]. Our results suggest that 
some of the suggestions of the EPPM from different 
use cases can be transferred to information security 
and especially to ransomware. One of these arguments 
is that fear attacks with high threat levels lead to a 
higher fear level. The fear of ransom demands is 
increasing. Additionally, a higher threat also leads to a 
higher intention to change behavior positively. 



















protect themselves from ransom demands. This 
positive change is also called acceptance of the 
message [7]. Constructive effectiveness also leads to a 
higher intention to change behavior, as Witte [7] 
proposed. Besides, we found that efficacy’s effect on 
fear is negative, matching Witte’s research [16]. In 
comparison with existing information security 
literature, similar results can be seen. In our work, we 
found similar effects for the influence of threat and 
efficiency on behavioral intention, like Vance et al. 
[32]. However, in contrast to other research, we found 
significant effects between susceptibility, severity, 
self-efficacy and behavioral intention in our EPPM 
model, in contrast to the model of Menard et al [33]. 
Furthermore, effectiveness has a strong influence on 
the intention to implement information security 
measures. People are willing to take security 
measures, such as saving backups and using antivirus 
scanners. This suggests that people will be more 
concerned about their data security and are confident 
that they can do so. It will allow us to expand the 
existing literature on the EPPM and its impact. This 
could be achieved by investigating, through 
experimental research, how behavioral intention, fear, 
and thus defense avoidance can be influenced in the 
case of ransomware, complementing the existing 
security literature. It can illustrate how further 
research can explain the constructs threat and efficacy, 
such as helping companies define communication 
strategies for data security. It is also essential that 
research and practice address the problem, as 
ransomware is becoming an increasingly relevant 
issue, threatening companies and individuals [17]. 
Moreover, both companies and private individuals 
incur unplanned costs after a ransomware attack, 
which could be reduced by appropriate practices [34]. 
 
6.3. Implications for practice  
 
The results identified have practical relevance in 
addition to the theoretical contribution. For example, 
they can help companies optimize their future 
corporate communication strategies regarding the 
danger of ransomware. Companies can use our 
findings to adapt their communication so that the best 
possible results can be achieved even in the case of a 
ransomware attack. The results can also provide 
insights into how private individuals can be influenced 
and warned about ransomware and how threat and 
efficacy can influence people's fear and behavior. As 
already mentioned, ransomware attacks can have fatal 
consequences. Therefore, it is vital to investigate how 
the consequences of ransomware attacks can be 
reduced or even prevented. Our study’s results suggest 
that by using a statement that conveys a high threat, 
people have a higher intention to behave securely and 
are more afraid of a ransomware attack, which leads to 
a defensive attitude. If, however, the statement that 
there are effective ways to protect themselves from the 
threat is also included, the participants tend to have a 
higher intention to behave securely again, and the fear 
of the threat can be reduced, which leads to a less 
defensive attitude. Accordingly, statements about 
ransomware that are intended to reduce the danger 
should always contain both aspects. This means that 
individuals can tackle a high threat, in case they know 
that there are effective mechanisms to protect oneself 
from the threat of ransomware. 
 
6.4. Limitations and future research 
 
While our study yields important findings in 
information security behavior, there are some 
limitations we would like to address in the following. 
Whereas information security is a concern to a broad 
spectrum of the population, our results are based on 
507 German participants, who have varying levels of 
professional experience. Compared to other countries, 
Germans seem to be more aware of cybercrime than 
other Europeans [34] are. Therefore, considering 
cultural differences might be insightful in future 
research. We chose ransomware as a relevant 
instantiation of information security threats and its 
appeal to individuals’ efficacy because of its 
prevalence [4]. However, ransomware is just one 
variant of malware, including spyware, phishing, 
botnets, worm-based attacks, or surveillance attacks 
[35]. Additionally, specific information security 
behaviors could be investigated. Some examples of 
this are log-off/lock screen behavior [36] and the 
opening of email attachments [37]. While we build on 
the advantages of a controlled setting, in which we 
were able to manipulate the amount of threat and 
efficacy participants were exposed to, future research 
could study actual user behavior. 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
This study deals with ransomware statements’ 
influence on people’s fear and behavior using the 
EPPM. By formulating a research design that varies 
the levels of the constructs threat and efficacy, 507 
study participants were interviewed. The data set was 
evaluated using a structural equation model. This 
study’s results provide valuable insights into how fear 
appeals in the form of threat and efficacy affect the 
fear and behavior of individuals who may be 
endangered by ransomware. The study shows that the 
participants who were given a low threat message in 
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their ransomware statement were less afraid and more 
likely to deal with the issue. At the same time, they 
were not as secure as people who had perceived a 
significant threat. In addition, participants who felt 
that they had little practical protection against 
ransomware were more afraid and therefore tended to 
be more defensive about the topic. However, they 
simultaneously had the intention to behave securely. 
In summary, it can be stated that the processes of the 
EPPM help explaining individuals’ reactions when 
facing the danger of ransomware. 
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Table 3. Operationalization of constructs 
Fear Arousal [8] 
I get very scared when I think that I might 
be affected by ransomware. 
FEAR1 
When thinking about being affected by 
ransomware, I get very worried. 
FEAR2 
I feel bad just thinking about the 
possibility of being affected by 
ransomware. 
FEAR3 
When I think about the possibility of 
being affected by ransomware, I get a 
bad feeling. 
FEAR4 
I fear being affected by ransomware. FEAR5 
Defense Avoidance [8] 
I do not want to think about my risk of 
being affected by ransomware. 
DA1 
I doubt if ransomware is a danger to me. DA2 
I do not want to protect myself from 
ransomware actively. 
DA3 
I do not want to think about the 
consequences of ransomware. 
DA4 
Behavioral Intention [11] 
In order to protect myself against 
ransomware, I intend to use antivirus 
programs for the next 3 months actively. 
BI1 
In order to protect myself against 
ransomware, I will probably use 
antivirus programs in the next 3 months 
actively. 
BI2 
In order to protect myself against 
ransomware, I plan to use antivirus 
programs in the next 3 months actively. 
BI3 
In order to protect myself against 
ransomware, I plan to actively create 
backups in the next 3 months. 
BI4 
In order to protect myself against 
ransomware, I plan to create backups 
within the next 3 months actively. 
BI5 
To protect myself against ransomware, I 
plan to create backups in the next 3 
months actively. 
BI6 
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